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Abstract
The relationship of the civil/non-profit sector and public administration may be examined from several specific aspects, 
but  in  our  opinion  these  fields  may be  put  into  three  –  relatively  –  well  distinguishable  groups.  Therefore,  the  
relationship of administrative bodies with civil organisations may be identified in a) the creation of administrative 
programs and participation in legislation; b) the provision of public services, and c) the protection of rights. From these 
three this work undertakes to describe in details the aspect of civil participation in program making and legislation , in a 
way that elaborates on the issue from the side of state administration.
The primary method of this research – due to the shortage of systematic scientific bases – can not be anything else than 
the comprehensive collection of formal institutional facilities provided by Hungarian laws.
The paper distinguishes those special forms of participation which approach the legislator (a state administrative body 
participating in legislation) directly, and those institutionalised solutions through which the citizen or a particular (civil) 
organisation may influence the content of laws not by approaching the legislator (state administrative body participating  
in legislation), but through another state organisation.
It can be stated that the Hungarian legal system makes it possible to channel the direct and institutionalised participation 
of civil entities within program- and law-making activities of organs belonging to public administration, expressing 
their interests. Moreover, the Hungarian legal system has introduced developed and sophisticated mechanisms even 
compared to the international legal practice. 
Real deficiencies can be rather detected concerning the material and legal consequencies of different initiatives, the 
frequency of convening various corporate bodies, and mere formal mode of operating the particular mechanisms.
Furthermore, it makes trouble that the civil/nonprofit sector is strongly „infected” by direct party politics in Hungary:  
there's a large number of pseudo-civil entities and initiatives within the scope of activities of proposal-making, advisory 
and coordinative bodies. A special appearance of the abovementioned difficulties is the lack of strong and effective  
state-civil society joint mechanisms which aggregate and uphold Roma (Gypsy) interests. 
In summary we can draw the conclusion that both the individual segments of civil society, the political culture and also  
the administrative bodies participating in legislation i. e. their representatives must improve to comply with the already 
existing legal framework of statutory instruments. 
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1. Introduction
Very different standpoints have been developed in the Hungarian literature regarding the features of entities that partly 
fill the territory between the state bodies and the narrower private sphere of the individual, and the boundaries of certain 
spheres (state, market and civil etc.). Many say many from Tamás Sárközy to Éva Kuti, they place the dividing and fault  
lines elsewhere, but all of them agree that the question is very important also from the aspect of the state’s performance  
ability as well.
Until the middle-end of the 2000s the state received serious critique, saying that the efficiency of the state organisation  
and within that the governmental direction is low because of the hyper proliferation of the background organisations  
and the constant intention aimed at the creation of half-state fake civil organisations (public foundations, public bodies, 
public companies).
While in the ’90s and 2000s majority of the authors condemned the state overload and the negative effects of the 
mesosphere, saying that it weakens civil activity, the compellingness to self-care, etc., today most of the criticism refers  
to the openly expanding state that draws the public duties to itself. Otherwise, in the latter case it is only that the state –  
recognising that directly or indirectly it is almost a sole financer in many fields – leaves out the local governments and 
for or non-profit organisations from the task fulfilment and financing process.
Apparently a process – serving parallel and same goals – is going on, in the frames of which the state consciously 
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reorganises the legal status and the subsidy system of the organisations of the civil sphere that have potential roles in the  
fulfilment of public duties. 
Civil organisation – at best – creates institutional channel between the society and the state, transmit the society’s needs 
and interests towards the state, on the other hand it forces the state to continuously legitimate itself, and to increase the  
publicity of its operation. Civil society and political state cannot exist without each other, but both try to be superior to 
the other. Even in a way that it expropriates the traditional institutions and classic territory of the other „party”…
One of  the final  questions is  how far the civil  society can go in the participation of  (political) decision making?  
According to the general view the presence is desirable and subservient only in the decision preparation phase that 
presents both informal and institutionalised forms. 
The popularity of the presently emerging (?) ideas of good governance, as well as their increased legitimacy is due not 
only  to  governmental  effectiveness,  but  also  to  the  closely  related  participatory  governance.  Plural,  participative 
democracy  provides  for  the  participation  of  society  and  economic  players,  thus  civil/non-profit  organisations  in 
satisfying common social needs – beyond periodic elections and referenda – within the framework of the right to make 
recommendations, to be informed and to object, as well as in several ways within task provision possibilities.  This 
starting point – at least for the present – has not been significantly changed by approaches that refer to the increasing  
role of the state or to the newly created needs and demands arising from different crises.
The relationship of the civil/non-profit sector and public administration may be examined from several specific aspects, 
but  in  our  opinion  these  fields  may be  put  into  three  –  relatively  –  well  distinguishable  groups.  Therefore,  the  
relationship of administrative bodies with civil organisations may be identified in a) the creation of administrative 
programs and participation in legislation; b) the provision of public services, and c) the protection of rights. From these 
three this work undertakes to describe in details the aspect of civil participation in program making and legislation , in a 
way that elaborates on the issue from the side of state administration.
2. Methodology
The analysis – or  systematic  presentation – of  the consultative,  coordinative or advisory,  proposer,  opinion-shaper 
institutions of public administration is completely missing within Hungarian administrative sciences in spite of the fact 
that  in  addition  to  hierarchic  and  merely  market  mechanisms  several  other  horizontal,  coordinative  and  service 
providing mechanisms have been established which led to the spread of different autonomous – and usually of low 
efficiency – structures in Hungary. Taking into account that many – if not all – of these entities and mechanisms are  
functioning by significant involvement of different civil (not-for-profit) actors, the main goal of my presentation has to 
be an introduction of the real weight and extent of this “sphere” by collection and systematization of existing forms  
within it. 
The primary method of this research – due to the shortage of systematic scientific bases – can not be anything else than 
the comprehensive collection of formal institutional facilities provided by Hungarian laws. This study makes an attempt 
at  introducing all  the  forms  appearing  in  the  positive  law in  Hungary;  especially those  by which  civil/non-profit  
organisations  can  take  part  within  the  preparation  of  administrative  programs  and  within  law-making  processes 
weltering within the scope of public administration.
Secondly, and of course, facts deducible from the texts of laws must be compared with reality, with factual practices of 
administrative organs: the execution of legal provisions sometimes demonstrates “creative” interpretations, moreover 
the very same legal institutions during different periods are implemented with huge variances.
And finally,  as a third aspect,  broader approaches to legal  and public policy must be involved: the basic features, 
historical  processes  and  the  dominant  factors  de facto determining law-making and  the  implementation  of  law in 
Hungary are to be shown.
Our  study  shall  be  commenced  with  the  abovementioned  aspect  of  public  policy,  outlining  the  most  important 
phenomena of the last decades.
3. The Traditional Features of Hungarian Public Administration in Public Policy Approach
A starting point of this subchapter is that new Central-Eastern-European democracies established after 1989 did not  
build the political system on layered, sophisticated consultation procedures and institutional systems based on wide 
scale social participation, but – almost exclusively – on the Parliament-centred politic formation structures operating on 
the principle of representation. Many believe that one of the great  problems of societies getting out from under a  
dictatorship is that due to the lack of civil society filling in the space between individuals and the state during their  
socialisation, the members of these societies could never naturally learn to incorporate the identification of problems, 
formulation of their interests, exchange their thoughts, the harmonisation of different opinions, due to which the various 
problem-handling methods were not developed, either. From the public policy side it may be stated that in Hungary the 
legal and institutional requirements of representative democracy were fulfilled after 1990, but since then no material 
change has happened towards participative democracy; this means that Hungarian democracy ”has frozen into” the level 
of representative democracy.1 
A father tendency, a feature which may be hardly separated from the one mentioned earlier is that the all-time state – 
formed after the transition –  imitates, reconstructs and replaces the civil sector through its conscious efforts, by this 
making it weaker. During the analysis of this, it must not be forgotten that in the economic and sociological literature of  
the past one or two decades the state, by undertaking the 'replacement' and 'simulation' of the organisation of market and 
self-regulating  social  mechanisms  and  the  political  organisation  of  society,  it  eventually  hampers  the  connection 
between political decision-making mechanisms and the actual fragmentation of the interests of society.
Based on the main features of public policy/administrative environment it must be stated about Hungary in advance that 
a) due to the traditional 'from top-down' system, a general – and tendency-like – weakness is the lack of democratic 
control, accountability and transparency; b) due to the politicised and instable practice of the reconciliation of interests, 
the quality of the decisions made in the public sector are often insufficient, as is their execution; c) public policy has 
balance problems; the weight and coordination of the relevant players is disproportionate and incalculable due to the  
extreme politicisation, and political predominance characterises the relationship of the political-administrative system 
and society, regardless; d) the final phase of public policy is missing; public policy processes begin but they often do  
not get to the end. There is no evaluation phase and closure.2 Within the scope of the latter evaluation the preliminary 
and subsequent impact studies are determinative, the main goal of which is grounding the decision-making situation of  
the legislator, in so far the analysis expands the pool of factors the consideration of which is – or should be – essential  
for well thought-through, grounded decision.3 In the Hungarian model of public policy decision making – as mentioned 
before – the 'top-down' approach is dominant, in so far as the institutional mechanisms of the involvement of interest  
protection-integrative organisations operate only formally.4 It  is  inseparable from the latter  fact  that  the traditional 
features of Hungarian political culture are paternalism, intolerance and the transformation of personal relations into 
political  ones,5 and last,  but  not  least  the presence of  corruption phenomena,  which may be observed at  a degree 
exceeding the average of the surrounding area.6 Among the classic governmental failure phenomena – which is not 
traditionally Hungarian, but may definitely be observed here – the theoretical  difficulties of setting and measuring  
public policy goals may be mentioned, as well as influence of strong interest groups, difficulties related to the size and 
complexity of governmental activities, and to the causal interconnection of certain public policy problems.7
In the 1990s – after the transition – there was a regrettable shift: during the transition to a market economy, the state  
withdrew from a number of fields, but during this 'abolishment of the state' several tasks could not be exposed to the  
profit-oriented processes of the market. These tasks were usually incorporated to the so-called non-profit sector, which  
1Jenei, György. 2010. Adalékok az állami szerepvállalás közpolitika-elméleti hátteréről.  [Supplements to the public 
policy – theoretical background of state participation] In  Államszerep válság idején [State role in crisis]. Edited by 
Hosszú, Hortenzia and Gellén, Márton. Budapest: COMPLEX. 95.
2Pesti, Sándor. 2001. Közpolitika szöveggyűjtemény. Budapest: Rejtjel. 206.
3In details see:  A Közigazgatás Korszerűsítésének kormánybiztosa által készített szempontok. „Részletes útmutató a  
hatályos  jogszabályok  utólagos  és  jogszabálytervezetek  előzetes  felülvizsgálatához.”  [Aspects  prepared  by  the 
government commissioner of the Modernization of public administration. 'Detailed guide to the subsequent review of 
valid  laws  and  the  preliminary  review  of  draft  laws.']  1995.  Budapest:  Közigazgatás  Korszerűsítésének 
Kormánybiztosa.  5.  
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5Kulcsár, Kálmán. 1995. Politika és jogszociológia. [Politics and legal sociology] Budapest: Akadémiai. 336. 
6http://www.ey.com/HU/hu/Newsroom/News-releases/global_fraud_survey_2010_pr (accessed July 11, 2013).
7Hajnal, György. 2008. Adalékok a magyar közpolitika kudarcaihoz. [Supplements to the failures of Hungarian public 
politics] Budapest: KszK ROP 3.1.1. Programigazgatóság. 33.
was unfortunately mixed up with the civil organisations both legally and practically: 'It often happened that in complete 
sectors only the signboards were repainted, shifted from state to public utility status, while the old structure, the old 
system of operation, state financing and the old 'expert' staff remained.'8 This environment, however, had a weakening 
effect on organised civil society, upholding its – unnecessarily strong – dependant status.
4. Civil Participation in Program Making and Legislation
4.1. General Questions of Civil Participation in Program Making and Legislation 
Among general pre-questions we shall refer to the fact that the narrowly viewed parliamentary section of legislation  
(which is not the subject of this work) and the section in which the contribution of state administration bodies is realised  
differ from each other, and the social organisations’ participatory rights and competences are also different in the two 
phases.9 Furthermore, there are significant differences between contribution to the decree making of state administrative 
bodies and of local governments.
The possible ways of participation may be categorised from several aspects:
Social participation in legislation has legally detailed (institutionalised) forms appearing on the side of the legislator as  
obligation (negotiations, forums, consultations and related basic feedback), as well as forms about which only general 
rules  of  the  legal  system may provide  a  starting point  regarding  their  possible  content  or  limits  (organisation  of 
demonstrations,  requesting  expert  opinion,  establishing  an  online  debate  forum,  etc.),  without  having  any  legal 
minimum regulation about the ‘observation’ and utilisation of such information transmitted to the decision-maker this 
way, and therefore these have been primarily regulated as possibilities of the potential users of these forms (these forms 
are not in focus of this work).
Among institutions establishing some kind of obligation on the side of the legislator, there are extremely diverse tools  
considering their ‘features and scope’, which show great diversity also regarding the degree and directness of the role 
they play in  establishing the content  of the final  (normative)  decision, or  regarding the targeted level  of  decision  
making/legislation  (local,  national  or  European).  It  is  worth  noting  that  this  work  concentrates  primarily  on  the 
institutions of civil cooperation operating at the national level – for the sake of understanding primarily in the state  
administration/local government division.
The literature, in another approach, categorises the tools and techniques of social participation into two big groups,  
distinguishing between traditional techniques and modern techniques. Among the latter ones, for example, the use of 
surveys may be mentioned.10
One  of  the  most  obvious  groupings  of  available  tools  (institutional  possibilities)  is  –  as  mentioned  above  –  the 
traditional division of direct and indirect tools: in this regard the notion of directness means, one the one hand, the 
institutions (typically in bodies) in which the representatives of civil society may express themselves directly and, may 
be able to make some decisions, while,  on the other hand, directness may be used also in the sense that  the civil  
organisation directly approaches the legislative body (thus in our narrow interpretation, the competent central  state  
administrative body or the body of representatives) with its suggestion or opinion. In the latter approach the indirect  
feature also means the influencing of the public administrative legislative body through another legislative body or  
person. 
8Pankucsi,  Márta.  2012.  Civilekkel  a  civilekért  –  Az  ellenzéki  szerveződésektől  a  minisztériumon  át  a  Furmann 
alapítványokig.  [With civilians  for  civilians – From opposition organisations through the ministry to  the Furmann  
foundations] In Civil társadalom és érdekképviselet Közép-Európában. [Civil society and the representation of interests 
in Central-Europe] Edited by Simon János.  Budapest: L'Harmattan – CEPoliti. 144.
9Vadál, Ildikó. 2011. A kormányzati döntések konzultációs mechanizmusai. [Consultation mechanisms of governmental 
decisions] Budapest: COMPLEX. 163.
10Reisinger, Adrienn. 2012. Civil/nonprofit szervezetek a kohéziós politikában – elméleti alapok. [Civil and non-profit 
organisations in cohesion policy – theoretical background] Tér és Társadalom 40: 113.
The titles of the chapter and the sub-chapter intentionally do not focus only on the main characteristics and rules of  
participation in  the narrowly interpreted legislation,  but  also wish to mention at  least  those practices  (institutions) 
through  which  civil/non-profit  organisations  may  perform  activities  –  which  may  not  be  transformed  into  legal 
instruments, but fit into the frameworks of law – influencing the life of the closer/broader community and participate in 
the creation of documents (strategies, concepts, declarations, calls, etc.). Therefore, when for the sake of understanding 
legislation is mentioned, it shall be interpreted – in a broader sense – by taking into account the abovementioned.
One of the most important pre-questions is how far civil society may go in participation in (political) decision making. 
According to the general (majority) national opinion, its presence is reasonable and desired only in the preparation 
phase of decision making manifesting informal and institutionalised forms.11 
Within the analysis of regulations related to legislation, it may be observed that the regulation – especially with regard  
to the issue before us – is still very much diverse.12 Before 1 January 2011, there was no comprehensive act which could 
have attempted to provide unified regulation for the possibilities and procedures of the enforcement of social interests in  
governmental decision-making mechanisms. A unified set of regulations about social participation is still missing; even 
though Act CXXXI of 2010 on social participation in the preparation of laws “implies in its title that we are facing a  
unified regulation, but this is not the case. In addition to this, sets of acts and government decrees contain relevant 
regulations regarding this issue.”13 Judit Tóth noted earlier that  ’The scope of tools related to the operation of the 
Government and the Office of the Prime Minister14 is rather diverse. Their common characteristic is that they rarely 
form a unified system, and rather try to find supporters among civilians for the specific realisation of the goals of the 
given government.’15 After reviewing the relevant valid regulations, we may arrive to a similar conclusion.
The significance of this scope of issues is magnified by the fact that in a plural social order more and more interests and 
values are formulated, the channelling of which into governmental decisions is unavoidable in order to uphold social  
peace. However, social participation in governmental decision-making mechanisms shall be legally settled, just like the 
hierarchy of  laws.  In  a  rule  of  law state  social  participation  in  legislative  procedures  is  not  an  optional  process 
depending  on  the  attitude  and  discretion  of  the  power  holder.  Moreover,  in  a  democracy,  especially  one  of  the 
participative type, the institutionalised system of proposing and opinion making shall not only go through quantity 
changes (’more forums, better regulation’), but also quality ones, which means that regarding these, normativity does 
not  only mean the  obligation to  establish and  create  these  institutions,  but  also  ‘making them unavoidable’,  thus 
ensuring their development through tools protected by law.
To summarize, it may be stated that one tool for alleviating possible political abuses typical in indirect democracy is the  
substantial participation of citizens and their organisations in public administrative decision making (legislation and the 
lawful influencing of individual cases), and the facilitation of this in a constantly “broadening” scope. 
In consideration of the before mentioned, that division may be the most obvious which
A) distinguishes those special forms of participation – regulated by law – able to influence legislation which approaches 
the legislator directly (a state administrative body participating in legislation), and
B) distinguishes  those institutionalised solutions through which the citizen or  a  particular  (civil)  organisation may 
influence the content of laws not by approaching the legislator (state administrative body participating in legislation),  
but another state organisation.16 
4.2. Civil tools in state administration directly influencing the legislator
11Sebestyén,  István.  2004.  Civil  dilemmák,  civil  kételyek  a  civil  szervezetek  (köz)életében.  [Civil  dilemmas,  civil  
doubts in the (public) life of civil organisations] Civil Szemle 28: 36. 
12Vadál (n 9) 170. 
13Ibid.
14Today Prime Minister’s Office.
15Tóth, Judit. 2003. Civilek részvétele a jogalkotásban. [Participation of civil society in legislation] In  Nonprofit jog. 
[Non-profit law] Edited by Tóth, Judit. Szeged: SZTE ÁJK. 18. 
16For example, the initiation of the procedure of the parliamentary commissioner of fundamental right based on Article 
24 paragraph (2) point e) and Article 30 paragraph (1) of the Fundamental Law of Hungary.
4.2.1. Direct participation in program making and legislation without membership in bodies
I. Organisation of a national referendum proposal
Act CCXXXVIII of 2013 on Referendum Proposal, European Citizens' Initiative and Referendum Procedure states that 
the proposal of constituents on setting the date of national referenda may be organised – among others – by associations  
as well, if the given question is connected with the scope of activities set forth in their articles of association.17
II. Notice of public concern
A notice  of  public  concern directs  attention to  some circumstances the  fixing or  termination of  which serves  the  
interests of the community or the whole society. For our topic it is extremely important that the notice of public concern 
may contain recommendations for legislation. [Article 141 paragraph (3) of Act XXIX of 2004 on the amendment and 
repeal of certain laws as well as the establishment of certain regulations relating to Hungary’s accession to the European 
Union]. The notion of complaint and notice of public interest, as well as the related deadlines are regulated similarly by 
Act CLXV of 2013 on complaints and notices of public interest to the way they were regulated before. However, there 
is a novelty in the regulation, namely that notices of public interest may be made in the protected electronic system of  
notices of public interest [Article 4 paragraph (1)]. 
III. Social negotiation and opinions
The two basic forms of social participation in the preparation of laws, general negotiation and direct negotiation appear 
in Article 7 of Act CXXXI of 2010 on social participation. The scope of the act covers opinion making by natural  
persons and non-state and non-local governmental bodies, organisations about draft laws and concepts of regulations 
grounding draft laws prepared by ministers. [Article 1 paragraph (1)] According to article 5 paragraph (5) of the act – 
with the exception of some laws made in fields listed in an itemised way in paragraph (3)  (e.g.  draft  law on the  
establishment of organisations or institutions) – social negotiation shall be initiated about the draft and reasoning of a) 
acts, b) decrees of government and c) decrees of ministers. 
General negotiation provides  for  the possibility of giving opinion through the website  of  the body publishing the  
concepts or draft (in forms obligatory for the body requesting opinion, e.g. by obligatory confirmation or preparation of 
substantial  summaries),  while  the  direct  negotiation  allows  the  relevant  minister  to  request  opinion  directly  from 
persons and  organisations. The primary legal form of  direct negotiation is the institution of  strategic partnership – 
creating obligations also on the side of the minister – the framework of which is provided by an agreement determining  
several elements.18 Through these agreements, the minister responsible for the preparation of laws may establish close 
cooperation with those organisations which are ready for mutual cooperation, and which represent wide-scope social  
interests in the preparation of the regulation of the given legal fields, or perform scientific activities in the given legal  
field (hereinafter referred to as strategic partners). A substantive weakness of the regulation is that Article 13 paragraph 
(2) of the act defines only in an exemplificative way – mentioning only some of the possible forms of organisations (e.g. 
registered church, trade union, civil organisation) – with whom such strategic partnership may be established. Another  
specific (and problematic) rule is the one according to which the obligation of the strategic partner is to represent the  
opinion of organisations which are not strategic partners but operate in the given field of law [Article 14 paragraph (1)].  
In  some cases  this  could mean that  the  opinion of  the  ’rival’ organisation operating in  the given field should be 
represented fully and credibly.
Another important rule [Article 14 paragraph (2)] in this area is that in addition to the strategic partners the minister 
responsible for the preparation of the given law may integrate others into the direct negotiation of the relevant draft, and 
upon request it shall provide the possibility for participation in the review of the given law.
However, it shall also be mentioned that the minister responsible for the preparation of laws may resort to other forms  
in addition to the abovementioned two for conducting negotiation (primarily for getting to know the opinion of non-
17Article 2 paragraph (1) point c).
18A good example of strategic partnership is the strategic agreement established in November 2012 between Tibor 
Navracsics deputy prime minister, minister of public administration and justice, as representative of the Ministry of 
Public Administration and Justice, and László Csizmadia, president and the representative of the Civil Cooperation 
Public Benefit Foundation, providing the organisational background of CÖF (Civil Cooperation Forum).
strategic members).19 It  is also important that the abovementioned act allows the legislator to define other opinion-
making and negotiation rights in other laws and legal instruments of state administration.20
For assessing the real – practical – significance of that legal institution it shall be considered that Article 5 paragraph 
(5) of the act contains a special and often used rule, which states that “The draft of the law shall not be put up for social  
negotiation  if  exceptional  public  order  requires  its  urgent  approval”.  Within  the  regulation  and  actual  practice  of 
national negotiation and review a significant aspect mentioned by literature is the capacity of public administration (in 
so far as with personal, technological and primarily temporal limits, the cautiousness of public administration may be  
easily explained).  Therefore,  the  extension  of  the examined procedure  with guarantee elements  shall  not  result  in 
disproportionate burden for state (administrative) organisations, endangering applicability.
The real legal nature of broadly interpreted social review is shown by certain constitutional requirements related to the  
social players of the preparation of laws. According to the statement of the Constitutional Court made in its Decision 
469/B/1990  CC, if  the organisations drafting the laws do not  comply with the obligations set  forth in the  Act  on 
Legislation, this violation of obligations in itself shall not be sufficient reason for assessing the unconstitutionality of  
the  enacted  laws.  Such  violation  of  legal  regulations  about  the  preparation  of  laws  may  only  ground  the  state 
administrative  or  political  responsibility  of  the  legislator.21 As the  Constitutional  Court expressed  in  its  Decision 
30/2000 (X. 11.)  CC, only those organisations are unavoidable for the legislator which are expressly and specifically 
named in law, which bear consensual or review rights and – due to their role in the democratic decision-making process,  
with  regard  to  the  negotiation  obligations  –  they possess  public  power.  If  the  act  does  not  define  expressly and  
specifically those  organisations  with  review rights,  but  only regulates  the  review rights  of  the  interested  national  
interest-representative organisations in general, the Constitutional Court did not consider the lack of review procedure a 
violation of the rule of law [as later Decision 20/2001 (IV. 12.) CC referred back to this decision].22 This practice has 
not changed significantly after the approval of the Fundamental Law and the new Act on Legislation.
IV. Lobby activities
It  is  worth mentioning lobby activities  in  a  separate subsection,  with special  regard to  corruption,  which  is  quite 
significant in Hungary.23 The regulatory activities of ministries, or in a broader concept, governmental legislation, make 
the institutions of the government targets of lobbying. The creation of the topics and target  persons of lobbying is 
determined  by –  in  addition  to  the  general  structure  of  the  governmental  decision-making  system –  the  level  of  
development of the institutional system and decision-making processes of the government, achieved in relation to the  
extension of the role taking of the state.24 During the performance of  their tasks,  civil  servants represent a public 
administration which is more open than ever, which maintains wide-scale professional and social relationship networks,  
which detects and reacts on influences coming from society to an increasing degree. The appearance of ‘public policy 
19It usually depends on the ad hoc decision of the ministries’ management which draft law will be negotiated at public  
debate, conference and informal discussion, in order to discuss the text of the regulatory concepts and drafts. These  
forms usually happen in parallel with public administrative negotiation.
20Beyond those set forth in the act on legislation – extending to strategic documents as well – there are rules among the 
provisions of Government Decree 38/2012 (III. 12.) on governmental strategic management about the social review of 
drafts. According to Article 15 paragraph (1) of the abovementioned decree, ‘If in relation with the given strategic  
document this decree regulates so, during preparation it shall be ensured for non-state actors to access the draft and 
express their opinion regarding it’. According to Article 16 paragraph (1) of the mentioned decree within social review  
drafts  shall  be published also on the government  website  determined in Article  1  point  b)  of  Government  Decree 
301/2010 (XII. 23.) on the publication and review of draft laws and regulatory concepts (which theoretically means 
unlimited and free access) and is shall be ensured for everyone to express an opinion about it in a digital form (as well  
as about any other draft, as well). According to Article 19 paragraph (1) of the mentioned government decree the person 
responsible  for  the  preparation  of  the  strategic  plan  documentation  may initiate  negotiations  about  the  draft  with  
selected non-state actors, in addition to social review.
21Vadál (n 9) 184. 
22Ibid. 
23Közigazgatás  Korrupció-megelőzési  Programja  2012  –  2014. [The  corruption  prevention  program  of  public 
administration 2012-2014] 2012. Budapest: KIM. 3-12. 
24Lékó, Zoltán,  ed.  2002.  Lobbikézikönyv.  [Lobby Handbook] Budapest:  Demokrácia Kutatások Magyar Központja 
Közhasznú Alapítvány. 25.
communities’ show that public law players frequently get into contact with each other, realise their common interests  
and act together when formulating their professional needs. Players composing these communities are familiar with the 
elements of public policy institutions and procedures, and know the real significance of factors influencing the public 
policy  decision-making  mechanism.  Moreover,  in  Hungary  it  may also  be  observed  that  in  order  to  increase  the 
efficiency of the enforcement of interests,  any decision which forms the conditions and elements of  public policy 
procedures may become the subject of lobbying – even if it has distant relations with the given fields and requires 
legislation. These may be budgetary, institution organisational or personal issues (e.g. in some sectoral fields, interest  
groups do not represent strictly professional issues but strive to influence the appointment of executive officers). This is  
an important issue, even though in European countries the strictly centralised management of public administration  
usually  significantly  keeps  away external  interest  groups  from decisions affecting the  internal  operation of  public  
administration.25
The aim of the lobby act submitted and approved in 2006 (Act XLIX of 2006 on lobby activities) was to channel the 
influence of business interest on public power (decisions) into legally regulated areas and make them controllable. 
Therefore  it  did  not  target  all  forms  of  the  enforcement  of  interests,  but  only  those  which  were  performed  by 
‘professional’ lobbyists or lobby organisations based on a commission and against remuneration. The linking of strictly 
interpreted civil/non-profit organisations to lobby activities in Hungary is somewhat difficult to understand, because the 
scope of the previous act on lobbying covered only organisations performing lobby activities in a commercial manner  
(based  on  agreement,  for  remuneration)  –  thus  did  not  concern  the  presentation  of  interests  or  arm  twisting  by 
organisations  due  to  ‘commitment  to  their  members’,  ‘belief’,  ‘patronage’,  or  ‘altruism’.  Nevertheless  several 
organisations which represent interests have operated as associations in Hungary, and – within some limits – it has  
never been prohibited for them to perform some activities in a commercial manner.
The act was valid for an exceptionally short period of time (only for four years) : among the reasons for its failure were 
the fact that the majority of those representing economic interests favoured the maintenance-support of self-regulation; 
the forcing of common law elements completely different from the Hungarian environment; institutions appeared which 
were not interpretable for Hungarian political, administrative and legal culture; owing to these factors, Hungarian public  
administration went into passive resistance;26 furthermore, there was the quasi lex imperfecta feature of the act, as well 
as  the  insufficiency  of  control  mechanisms  outside  of  law.  Still,  the  most  determinative  feature  was  the  narrow 
substantial scope of the act, the fact that it wished to regulate one narrow aspect of the issue – easily eluded by covering 
material interests – at a high level, without listing or at least slightly regulating the other types of influence – extending  
the scope of lobby activities to those, as well. The previous regulation practically did not consider the fact that today 
only those organisations may achieve real results which have serious professional background and resources, and are 
able to keep up with the latest novelties of technological development – in each case through professionally organised 
transmission of information. The regulation considered lobbyists ‘in reality’, approaching the civil servant personally or 
by means of telecommunication, and neglected the more sophisticated, but very much influential, financed forms of 
pressuring [constant pressuring through ‘position papers’ summarising the official opinion,  ‘grassroots type lobbying’ 
(when many write  on  the  same topic  under  their  ‘own name’),  or  certain  indirect  tools  of  ‘community relations’ 
improving the consideration of the organisation by the decision-makers were fully excluded from the regulation.]. 
It  was the failure of the previous lobby act which showed that  in certain fields the state cannot intervene with its  
substitutive regulations even in the absence of self-regulation (which has been spreading significantly against central  
regulations): in some social fields, permanent results may be achieved only through the consistent stimulation of self-
regulating mechanisms, which is a slow and delicate solution, but lacks any alternative. This is the reason – partly –  
why the new lobby regulation creates obligatory rules related to the enforcement of interests only on the side of the civil  
servant receiving the lobbyist (by this strengthening the integrity of public administration),27 and otherwise it trusts itself 
25Ibid.
26According to the report of the Justice Service of the Ministry of Public Administration and Justice prepared in 2012 
the 307 registered lobbyists tried to ‘officially’ influence only 316 (!) state or self-governmental measures within four  
years.  E.g.  according  to  the  report  at  the  approximately  3,200  local  governments  the  lobbyists  approached  the 
competent persons only in relation to 30 decisions within four years (!)…
27Hungary undertook the obligation to  establish  Codes of  Professional  Ethics for  civil  servants  and the employee 
protection public order approved by professional public bodies independent from the government. See Section 1 of 
Government Decision 1080/2013. (II. 25.) on the approval of the action plan about the obligations of Hungary within 
to the already established criminal law barriers (e.g. the crime of bribery). 28 In Hungary this concept – realising social 
realities – conflicted with the opinion of organisations regarding the previous concept. Thus  Amnesty International,  
Greenpeace, the Társaság a Szabadságjogokért  (Hungarian Civil Liberties Union, TASZ) and others approached the 
minister  of  public  administration and  justice  with an  open  letter  in  2012,  complaining that  after  2010 it  was  not 
regulated substantively how business associations and business interest groups may influence the possessors of public  
power:  ‘Article 19 section b) of Act CXXXI of 2010 on social participation in legislation (hereinafter referred to as: 
SPL) annulled act XLIX of 2000 on  lobby activities without replacing it with proper regulations. The possibility of 
strategic partnership ensured in Article 13 of SPL concerns only a narrow field of the enforcement of interests. Through 
strategic partnership, ministries may establish direct relationship with those organisations ready for mutual cooperation 
which represent a wide range of social interests in the preparation of the regulation of the given legal fields, or perform  
scientific activities in the given legal field. This act is far from regulating lobbying properly. It provides exclusively for 
cooperation with the ministries, even though lobbying is more than participation in ministerial level legislation: each  
activity aiming at  influencing a  public  power  decision or  at  the  enforcement  of  interests  belongs to  the scope of 
lobbying.’29
In summary it may be stated (and it is confirmed by the letter of TASZ) that in Hungary the notion of lobbying may be  
apprehended in broader context than commercial activities, and may be interpreted and regulated likewise. 
4.2.2. Participation in Program Making and Legislation Through Membership in Bodies
4.2.2.1. Consultation
National definition of consultation
In Hungary the broadest concept of consultation has been used in a triple interpretation (or meaning):
a) one the one hand, the broader meaning includes the most comprehensive forms of social negotiation and review 
[System of National Cooperation (NER), National consultation];
b) on the other hand, it includes the legal forms of negotiation and review described earlier;
c) finally, it still includes the specific, described consultative forums, as well.
The present sub-chapter uses the third – narrower, more traditional – meaning as its starting point.
General issues of consultation
In relation to consultation, it may be generally stated that grounded decision making, quality governance and legislation 
require  discussion  with  the  interested  parties,  including  consultation.  Consultation  is  the  involvement  of  those 
concerned in the procedure of decision making in order to create real social negotiation. In this sense, therefore, the 
definition relates not only to negotiation in the preparatory phase, but also to the unique realisation of the shaping of  
political will, which happens in order to establish the content of the law based on compromise.30 ‘In the long run, social 
peace may be maintained by compromises through the politics of agreements. Governance may be  ‘successful and 
good’ only if it takes into account the heterogeneity of those governed.'31 
The  significance  of  consultation  is  also  stressed  by  the  Commission,  which  published  an  announcement  about 
consultation, supporting the notion that during consultation each of those concerned should be allowed to properly 
the international initiative of the Open Government Partnership.
28It has been a debated issue in Hungarian public administration at what level and at what depth the professional ethical  
norms enforceable  within  public  service  shall  be  regulated;  within  the  framework  of  the  Magyary  Zoltán  Public  
Administration Development Program – theoretically – the old approach is getting stronger again, which – within legal 
frameworks – would allow for the wide-scope self-regulation of those concerned.
29http://tasz.hu/jogallamvedo?page=2 (accessed May 10, 2013).
30Drinóczi, Tímea 2010. Minőségi jogalkotás és adminisztratív terhek csökkentése Európában. [Quality legislation and 
the reduction of administrative burdens in Europe] Budapest: HVG-ORAC. 32-33.
31Vadál (n 9) 57. 
express  their  opinion.32 In  most  member  states  of  the  European  Union,  separate,  permanent  forums  have  been 
established for macro-level consultation which facilitate the continuous relationship between the government and social  
partners and other representatives of interests – without the burden of immediate agreements – and within this they get  
the chance to familiarise themselves with each other’s opinion.33 Beyond the narrow focus of issues related to the world 
of labour, this covers also specific policy issues. In member states, macro level consultations aiming at globally shaping  
the economy and social policy are usually hosted within the institutional frameworks of prestigious, dominant forums. 
Naturally,  governmental-civil  discussion shall  also be  part  of  social  discussion.  In  addition  to  social  partners,  the  
representatives  of  civil  organisations  ‘shall  also  be  present  in  the  work  of  the  consultative  bodies  of  macro-level 
negotiation of interests’.34
Nevertheless ‘it may be stated that the prestige of consultation is much lower in Hungary than in other member states’.35 
In  Hungary the  consultative role is  often  interpreted  as  of  lower value,  failure  – also in  the  self-evaluation,  self-
assessment of the players; as a synonym of  slow marginalisation in substantial – macro level –  policy-making. This 
same  fact  lies  in  the  background  of  the  fact  that  in  Hungary  consultation,  negotiation,  cooperation  is  basically 
agreement-centred, bargain-oriented. We shall also add that today in Hungary ‘consultation is [often] not the indicator  
or instrument of values, but of relatively quickly changing interests’. A closely related phenomenon (fact) is that while  
in most of the old member states consultation is substantial (ensured by legal guarantees) and constant, in Hungary –  
traditionally  –  a  lower  level  of  regulation  and  ‘ad  hoc’ character  is  dominant36,  a  situation  intensified  by the 
exceptionally infrequent convening of certain forums.
The regulation regarding bodies operating alongside the Government (and ministries and other public administrative 
bodies)  is  individual:  generally the operation of  each body is settled by separate law or legal  instruments of state 
administration, which contributes to the fact that there is often parallelism or overlaps in their tasks and competences.37 
The functions of bodies operating beside the government are not always possible to separate; sometimes bodies with the 
same tasks operate under different names (e.g. inter-ministerial commissions or councils – see later). The main reason 
for these difficulties is that ‘in Hungary comprehensive, high-level framework regulations about the main types are still  
missing’.38 We do not necessarily agree that the issue should be regulated in more detailed constitutional rules, but it 
seems obvious that  a  detailed  regulation  at  the  level  of  acts  is  necessary.  The more  comprehensive  regulation  of  
consultative bodies is reasonable because the broadly interpreted governmental consultation goes beyond consultative  
bodies  operating  beside  the  government  or  ministries,  and  includes  macro  level  forums  independent  from  the  
governments, as well as territorial level mechanisms and specific bodies.
It must also be added that ‘By today a complex system of governmental consultative bodies has been established in all  
modern  public  administrative  systems’.39 However,  despite  their  significance  and  quantity,  the  social  sciences  pay 
relatively little attention to these institutions, having a role in the shaping of governmental decisions,  ‘[even though] 
almost invisibly a new sector has emerged, the operation of which is essential for the quality of governmental activities  
and is also important for their transparency.’40 
It  should be noted that  there is  no good name for this system of organisations in Hungarian law.  The expressions 
32Towards  a  reinforced  culture  of  consultation  and  dialogue  –  General  principles  and  minimum  standards  for  
consultation of interested parties by the Commission. Communication for the Commission, COM(2002) 704 final.
33Ladó,  Mária  and  Tóth,  Ferenc.  2002.  A  konzultáció  és  intézményei  az  Európai  Unióban,  tagállamaiban  és 
Magyarországon.  [Consultation  and  its  institutions  in  the  European  Union,  in  its  member  states  and  in  Hungary]  
Budapest: OFA. 192. 
34Bódi, György and Jung, Adrienn and Lakovits, Elvira. 2003. Civil partnerség. [Civil partnership.] Budapest: KJK-
KERSZÖV. 190.
35Ladó and Tóth (n 33) 193.
36Ibid. 194.
37Vadál (n 9) 80. 
38Ibid. 
39Vadál (n 9) 17.
40Ibid. 
‘background institutions’,  ‘auxiliary organisations’, or  ‘consultative organisation’,  ‘institutions of social dialogue’, as 
well as ‘proposer-review organisations’ are (may be) imprecise and deceptive, especially because in some cases these – 
very diverse – organisations possess public power-like competences in addition to the narrowly interpreted consultative  
rights.
Therefore it is necessary to scientifically define the various types of these organisations and clarify – in a comparative 
manner – their role in public power decision making (the preparation of laws), and due to the lack of any laws to 
generally regulate their participation in the governmental decision-making system, with regard to their importance (see  
later).
Grouping of consultative bodies
For the transparency of governmental consultative41 bodies, they may be grouped according to the following actors:42
a) the scope of participating organisations (e.g. delegating member);
b) their features of civil cooperation;
c) their method of selecting members;
d) the legal regulation of the institution;
e) the features and content of the members’ rights;
f) the frequency of application; and
g) the phase or level of governmental activities to which each is related.
Ad a) Types of governmental (state administrative) consultative bodies based on their members
Based on the scope of participating bodies (organisations) Vadál distinguishes between internal consultative bodies of  
governmental  activities and external consultative bodies of governmental activities. In  the first one, she lists those 
institutions and procedures (e.g. government commissions, cabinets and inter-ministerial commissions), in which only 
state bodies participate and the representatives of civil society (non-state bodies) are usually not present among the 
members. Into the latter grouping she lists those bodies within which, in addition to the representatives of governmental  
bodies, the institutions of the widest range of civil society are present: such as social organisations, representatives of  
interests,  professional  and  expert  organisations,  representatives  of  science,  professional  chambers,  etc.  Within  this 
grouping  it  is  important  that  ‘through  these  bodies,  the  interconnection  between  governmental  activities  and  the 
activities of organisations interested in and concerned about decisions may be established. Through these bodies, the 
presentation  of  interests,  their  collision,  striving  for  consensus,  and  the  professional  and  scientific  grounding  of 
decisions may be realised’.43
There is another grouping similar to Vadál’s which, as one method of the presentation and enforcement of specific 
aspects of interests – significant in the preparation of governmental decisions – at each level and area of governmental  
activities [partly sectoral (strictly professional) and partly functional (beyond the aspects of certain sectors] which
a) enforces the given (public policy) interests by establishing an independent coordinative mechanism or body (mainly 
relying on the staff of the state administration), or
b) introduces the institutional solutions – including external actors – of  ‘transmitting information’ related to interests 
‘into governmental activities’.44
41In lack of other indication primarily consultative bodies operating next to central state administrative bodies are in the  
focus of the analysis.
42Vadál (n 9) 60.
43
Ibid.
44
Balázs,  István.  2011.  Magyarország  közigazgatása.  [Hungary’s  public  administration]  In  Szamel,  Katalin, 
As has been  mentioned before,  both types of  organisations may be put  into the group of  so-called governmental  
auxiliary bodies  the  ‘common feature of  which is that  part  or  all  of  their activities is  related to the governmental 
decision-making procedure with the aim that these decisions shall be well-grounded from all – professional, legal and 
political – aspects and the delivered decisions shall be used also in reality’.45 
Based on the abovementioned facts, it is clear that the two types of organisations are not ‘identical’: while the second – 
theoretically – serves the observation, aggregation of interests and their transmission to the decision-makers, the first  
one performs the channelling of the revealed interests, and the professional preparation of their presentation in the drafts 
of different programs and legal instruments, as well as their negotiation and concretisation within public administration.  
However, the majority of practical difficulties well interpretable from the side of civil society result from the lack of 
regulation  and  the  conflict  of  existing  regulations  related  to  the  tasks  and  composition  of  these  two  ‘types  of 
organisations’ and their relationship,  with regard to the fact  that  the two types of bodies exist simultaneously.  For 
example, the two consultative bodies for the representation and facilitation of the management of Roma issues have  
been established accordingly, but the relationship between the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Social Development and 
Roma  Issues46 and  the  Roma  Coordinative  Council47 has  not  been  clarified;  it  is  hardly  interpretable  and  less 
transparent, based on government decisions and practical experiences.
This situation is further complicated by the fact that within the internal negotiating mechanisms of state administration 
(at  the  meeting  of  the  Government  performing  final  coordination,  or  in  different  coordinative  and  consultative  
mechanisms, bodies) the representatives of civil organisations (may) appear directly in several ways. For example – to 
continue with the abovementioned example – according to the Government Decree establishing the Roma Coordinative 
Council  ‘[The] Government calls upon the leaders of central state administrative bodies to ensure, in case of laws 
related to the social development of Roma people defined in the legislative program of the Government, the possibility 
to  provide  opinion  for  the  [civilian  and  non-civilian]  members  of  the  Council  within  the  public  administrative  
negotiation’. Furthermore, Section 49 of Government Decree 1144/2010. (VII. 7.) on the rules of procedures of the 
Government must be mentioned, according to which the undersecretary for administration of the Ministry of Public  
Administration and Justice may invite external persons – for example representatives of civil organisations – to the  
meeting  of  the  undersecretary  of  administration;  and  its  section  59,  based  on  which  persons  –  for  example 
representatives of civil organisations – invited personally by the Prime Minister may participate at the meeting of the  
Government. 
Balázs  István,  Gajduschek  György  and  Koi  Gyula,  eds.  Az  Európai  Unió  tagállamainak  közigazgatása.  [Public 
administration of the European Union’s member states] Budapest: COMPLEX. 745. 
45
Ibid. 
46Within the scope of the examined field the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Social Development and Roma Issues  
supports those written in section a) herein. The Government established the Inter-Ministerial  Committee for Social 
Development and Roma Issues for improving the standard of living and social status of Roma people and those living in 
poverty and for the harmonisation of governmental activities aiming at facilitating their social integration. The primary 
task of the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Social Development and Roma Issues – based on Government Decision  
1199/2010. (IX. 29.) on the establishment of the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Social Development and Roma Issues  
–  is  to  harmonise  activities  related  to  social  development,  to  make recommendations  for  the  Government  for  the  
harmonised  planning of  the  resource  needs  of  tasks  related  to  the  social  development  and  for  the  supervision  of  
finances, as well as to coordinate and evaluate the execution of governmental tasks aimed at improving the standard of 
living and social status of Roma people and those living in poverty and at facilitating their social integration.
47An institutional realisation of those written in section b) herein (in the examined field) is the Roma Coordinative 
Council  established by Government  Decision 1102/2011. (IV.  15.)  on the establishment of the Roma Coordinative 
Council, which was established by the Government based on social partnership for the establishment and execution of  
measures facilitating the effective development of the Roma population, as well as for rendering an opinion about the 
results. The Roma Coordinative Council is an advisory, consultative body supporting social development, and in line 
with the aims of the Government it  is  a specific forum for transmitting information related to the interests of the 
concerned social groups into governmental work.
Ad  b)  Basic  types  of  governmental  (central  state  administrative)  consultative  bodies  –  from  the  aspect  of  civil  
cooperation:
1. bodies ensuring membership-like civil participation48 (mixed system);
2.  bodies  composed  of  the  delegates  of  only (central)  state  administrative  bodies  (e.g.  Sulinet  Expressz  Program 
[Internet at Schools Express Programme] Project Council49) – without civil organisational rights;
3.  bodies  composed  of  the  delegates  of  only (central)  state  administrative  bodies  –  with  the  possibility of  direct  
channelling of civil interests;50
4. bodies composed exclusively of experts – without direct and expressed civil participation;51
5. no civil member, but civil organisations may make suggestions for the appointment of members (their opinion is 
requested in a formal procedure, e.g. Hungarian Design Council52).
Ad c) Main forms of establishing membership:
1. ministerial request and appointment – without civilian cooperation (e.g. recommendation) before the appointment;
2. ministerial request and appointment – with the possibility (right) for civilian recommendation;
3. submission of a declaration of unilateral accession,53 and declaration of will54;
4. naming a specific civil organisation in a normative source of law (e.g. HUNGARNET Association 55, or earlier the 
National Association of Hungarian Artists);
5. with election based on the candidacy system.
It is important that the abovementioned types do not cover all types operating in practice, with special regard to the fact 
that the mechanisms of selecting (civilian) members and of the establishment of membership are not fixed in each case.  
A practical difficulty which has been mentioned in the literature for a long time is that in institutions (bodies) where 
there are provisions about the selection of civilian members,  we usually only find the description of activities the  
performance of which allows organisations to participate, ‘but it is [often] left in the shadow what the exact mechanism 
48The expression 'civil participation' primarily means those cases when the natural person participating in a consultative  
body is representative of a civil organisation, not in his own name, directly due to his professional expertise gained at 
the given field.
49Government Decree 283/2003. (XII. 29.) on the tasks and operational rules of the Sulinet Expressz Program Project 
Council.
50The president of the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Social Development and Roma Issues may invite other people – 
typically representatives of Roma civil organisations – based on the founding legal document.
51See for example the composition of the Scientific Committee set forth in Article 6 paragraph (1) of Government  
Decree 112/2011 (VII. 4.) on the (…) scientific committee supporting the work of the National Atomic Energy Office. 
52For the appointment of the members of the National Design Council (MFT) the president of the National Office of  
Intellectual Property makes a recommendation, for the creation of which he requests the opinion of related professional  
and interest representation organisations [Article 2 paragraph (2) of Government Decree 266/2001 (XII. 21.) on the 
Hungarian Design Council].
53According to Article 1 of Ministry of Human Resources Decree 50/2012. (XII. 19.) on the National Patient Forum any 
civil organisation may join the section of the National Patient Forum (herein after referred to as: NBF) in line with its  
activities with a declaration of accession sent to the Board of the NBF if the civil organisation operates in compliance  
with act on civil organisations and performs its activities in the field of health care. 
54According to Article  2 paragraphs (1)  and (2)  of  Government  Decree 65/2000. (V.  9.)  on the establishment and 
detailed rules of the operation of the Charitable Council, the public benefit organisations performing charitable tasks 
which want to become members of the Council may submit a related declaration of intent to the minister – and the  
minister  shall  automatically  provide  credentials  for  the  representatives  of  those  organisations  which  comply with 
conditions set forth in Article 1 paragraph (2) and have submitted their declaration of intent. 
55Section  1  of  Government  Decision  1129/2013.  (III.  14.)  on  the  establishment  of  the  National  Information 
Infrastructure Development Program Council and the definition of its rules of procedure the Government established, as 
proposer, review and advisory body the National Information Infrastructure Development Program Council, and its 
section 6 requests – among others – the president of the HUNGARNET Association to participate in the work of the 
Program council as a permanent member.
is for their selection’ and what methods may be used for ensuring the democracy of the procedure.56 This deficient legal 
regulation  allows  the  government  (any  government,  not  just  the  current  one)  to  arbitrarily  select  from  among 
organisations formally complying with all conditions, not necessarily paying attention to their real social significance  
and professional preparedness. 
Ad d) Legal regulation of consultative bodies – from the civil point of view:
Open legislation may become  counterproductive if  ‘the processing of opinions and the feedback procedure are not 
regulated  and  managed  properly’ –  says  Vadál.57 Mentioning these  elements  is  especially  important  regarding  the 
domestic – external – consultative bodies, because  these communication aspects provide the basis of most practical  
difficulties.
Ad e) Rights and tools available for the civilian member or for the body with civilian member:
1. review;
2. recommendations;
3. negotiation of interests;
4. preparation of decisions;
5. decision making;
6. coordination;
7. analysis and evaluation of execution;
8. lawsuit.58
Among – public power-like – rights which go beyond traditional consultative rights (the right to information, the right 
to negotiate, the right to make recommendations, the right to give an opinion) those shall be mentioned through which 
decision  making  power  is  divided  between  the  public  administrative  body  (typically  the  Government)  and  the 
consultative body.59 In such cases the original possessor of the decision making right, who is responsible for decision  
making,  cannot  deliver  the  decision  on  its  own,  because  the  concerting  right  (co-decision  making  right)  of  the  
mentioned body limits this. Naturally, in such cases the original possessor of the decision-making right cannot fully  
delegate  the  right  to  decision  making  or  its  responsibility  for  the  decision  (and  the  liability  for  its  possible 
consequences), but with the self-regulating ‘delegation’ of certain elements of decision making it may ensure substantial  
participation and unavoidable control-possibility to the representatives of the targeted groups. A good – though as yet  
theoretical – example is the Framework Agreement established between the Government of Hungary and the National  
Roma Self-Government [NRSG], based on which ‘Within their cooperation the Government and the NRSG establish a 
draft government decree, in which they define the certain fields of intervention and the participants of the co-decision 
agreement and together with the bodies appointed for co-decision-making define the co-decision-making mechanism 
relevant for the given field, by taking into consideration, and keeping in line with, the valid EU and national procedural  
regulations’. In an exemplificative manner, the Framework Agreement defines those fields in which it wants to give to 
the NRSG effective and substantial rights for the enforcement of interests: ‘The Government establishes the co-decision 
system primarily in the fields of programs aiming at the expansion of employment, increasing standards of education 
and improving standards of living, as well as of scholarship programs, investment and employment supports.’ It is clear, 
therefore,  that  the  decision-making  and  co-decision-making  rights  may primarily  contain  partial  rights  related  to 
tenders, funds, or personal issues, sometimes not in a substantial manner, but ‘only’ in form of veto60 or ‘quasi veto’, 
these latter ones covering the elements which, for example,  allow for the postponement of decision-making or the  
56Héthy, Lajos. 2010. Civil beszéd vagy “párt-beszéd”? [Civil speech or “party-speech”?] Budapest: Napvilág. 96.
57Vadál (n 9) 162.
58The rule defined in Article 25 paragraph (7) of Act XXVI of 1998 on the rights and equal opportunities of disabled 
persons, according to which against those violating the rights of disabled persons defined in law the National Council 
for Disabled and the national interest representative organisations of disabled persons may initiate a lawsuit. 
59Vadál (n 9)  61. and 86. 
60The exclusive recommendation right and the right to initiative, as well as the right to consent and the decision bound  
to a certain voting rate may be considered as such.
suspension of the execution of the delivered decisions.61 
Ad g) Types of consultative bodies related to certain governmental levels:
We may distinguish between bodies established beside non-local-governments based on whether they were created by 
the  Government  or  independently  from  it.  The  best  example  for  the  latter  is  the  National  Economic  and  Social 
Committee established by Act CXIII of 2011 on the National Economic and Social Committee, which was created with 
the  aim  of  discussing  comprehensive  ideas  related  to  economic  and  societal  development  and  national  strategies 
existing through governmental  cycles,  and  facilitating the  elaboration and  realisation of  harmonised  and  balanced 
economic  growth  and  the  related  social  models.  The  Committee  was  established  as  a  consultative,  proposer  and  
advisory body independent from the Parliament and the Government, and as the complex and most diverse consultative 
forum of social dialogue between organisations representing employers’ and employees’ interests, economic chambers,  
civil organisations operating in the field of national policy, national and foreign representatives of science, and churches 
defined in a separate act.62 It  is worth noting that the solution is not unique in Hungarian legal development.63 It is 
important that independence from the government does not mean that during the activities of the forums, opinions of the 
Government  and  civil  organisations  cannot  be  directly in  conflict  or  that  the  government  cannot  be  substantially 
‘influenced’ in some ways.64
In addition to the most comprehensive consultative mechanism(s), consultative bodies operating beside the Government 
and certain central state administrative bodies form a separate category; these partly appear in classic, sectoral fields 
(health care, education, social issues, economic issues65, etc.), and partly may be identified as intersectoral fields (e.g. 
see the before mentioned Roma issue). 
In  addition  to  consultative  bodies  operating  beside  or  ‘between’ central  state  administrative  bodies  the  territorial 
consultative bodies,  or  bodies with a consultative type of  tasks shall be mentioned, the majority of which may be 
characterised as so-called quasi state administrative bodies. These may also be called atypical mixed bodies, in so far as 
they appear neither as fully state administrative, nor fully local-governmental, syndicate types of bodies. 66 It is true in 
general  that  the main reason for their existence is that  the presentation of general and local  interests, abilities and 
expectations could not be possible or reasonable at the same time at other forums or scenes. These creatures may be  
described as territorial cooperative mechanisms – typically aiming at program making – in so far as they primarily try to  
act  as  forums  for  the  exchange  of  opinions  and  for  dialogue between  civilians  and  local-governmental  and  state  
administrative  (types  of)  bodies.  They  are  usually  without  organisational  independence,  but  they  are  usually 
independent in exercising their tasks and competences. Examples of such are the Regional Social Policy Committees or 
the Regional Tourism Boards. 
61For details see: Rixer, Ádám. 2013. A roma érdekek megjelenítése a jogalkotásban. [Emergence of Roma interests in 
legislation] Budapest: Patrocinium. 158-160.
62Article 2 paragraph (1) of Act XCIII of 2011 on the National Economic and Social Council.
63The Economic and Social Council – which has always operated in an unstructured way and without substantial rights 
– was established in the building of the Parliament on 24 August 2004, and wished to remain a professional forum  
independent from the government and party politics ‘by discussing long-term national, strategic issues’. In the Council,  
national  trade  unions  and  employers’  interest  representatives,  and  representatives  of  chambers,  investors,  civil  
organisations and  science  were  present  as  members.  The  GSZT expressly aimed  at  being  the  forum  of  national 
consensus seeking to rise above everyday political fights. In this institution the different sectors were allowed to present  
their opinions about issues the nation was facing that would determine long-term development.
64For example, based on Article 153 paragraph (1) of Act I of 2012 on the Labour Code, the Government shall receive  
authorisation to define in decree – after consultation in the National Economic and Social Council – about a) the lowest 
obligatory wage and b) the amount and validity of the guaranteed wage minimum.
65See for example Government Decision 1166/2012. (V. 22.) on the reorganisation of the budget estimate from reserves 
available for extraordinary governmental measures in order to ensure the resources necessary for the performance of the  
tasks of the Corporate sector and the Government’s Permanent Consultative Forum.
66Patyi,  András  and Varga,  Zs.  András.  2012.  Általános közigazgatási  jog (az  Alaptörvény rendszerében). [General 
administrative law (Within the system of the Fundamental Law)] Budapest: Dialóg Campus. 329.
Summary statements and general conclusions in relation to consultation
It  is  an  assumption  in  legal  literature  –  which  goes  beyond our  specific  subject  –  is  that  the  relationship  of  the 
established forums for the preparation of decisions and for negotiation, their specific role and significance should be  
clarified in law.67 For a long time the main question has been whether in the case of decision-making mechanisms  
supplemented with mainly informal,  ‘customised’ elements, the strictness of the legal regulations (deeper and more 
accountable than today) – and of the transparency and higher level of legal security theoretically achievable by this –  
would impose great difficulties in reaching substantial compromises and using practical ‘quickly reacting’ methods. It 
may be stated that the difference mechanisms aiming at the preparation of decisions should be formalised through more 
detailed legal provisions than today.68
Among further difficulties, on the one hand, the low level of professional preparedness and material resources of social 
players (the latter may appear, for example, in relation to the costs of preparing an expert opinion), and, on the other  
hand, as the capacity deficiency of the governmental side, the lack of such civil servant staff – specialised in negotiating 
activities – in central public administration may be mentioned.
4.3. Tools Influencing the Legislator Indirectly, Through Other Bodies
Here those possibilities will be presented through which the citizen or the civil organisation influences the contents of  
laws  enacted  by  competent  public  administrative  bodies  by  approaching  not  the  legislator,  but  another  state 
organisation. In some cases, these mechanisms may make the chances of influencing the legislator rather indirect, and  
sometimes – as will be shown – quite distant (through the initiation of the review of the content of the given law, which  
may lead to the annulment of the law or legal regulation by the Constitutional Court). 
Such tools may be, among others,
1. Constitutional complaint. According to article 24 paragraph (2) section c) of the  Fundamental Law, based on the 
constitutional complaint the Constitutional Court – which may be approached also by the civil organisation concerned 
about the given issue – reviews the harmony of the law used in the individual case with the Fundamental Law;
2. Initiating the procedure of the parliamentary commissioner for fundamental rights. According to article 24 paragraph 
(2) section e) of the Fundamental Law, upon the initiative of the Government, one-fourth of the members of Parliament, 
the  president  of  the  Curia,  the  Chief  Prosecutor or  the parliamentary  commissioner  for  fundamental  rights,  the 
Constitutional Court reviews the harmony of laws with the  Fundamental Law  within the frameworks of subsequent 
norm control.  The related procedure of  the parliamentary commissioner of  fundamental  rights may be initiated by 
anyone, in line with article 30 paragraph (1) of the Fundamental Law.
5. Conclusion
It can be stated that the Hungarian legal system makes it possible to channel the direct and institutionalised participation 
of civil entities within program- and law-making activities of organs belonging to public administration, expressing 
their interests. Moreover, the Hungarian legal system has introduced developed and sophisticated mechanisms even 
compared to the international legal practice. 
Real deficiencies can be rather detected concerning the material and legal consequencies of different initiatives, the 
frequency of convening various corporate bodies, and mere formal mode of operating the particular mechanisms.
Furthermore, it makes trouble that the civil/nonprofit sector is strongly „infected” by direct party politics in Hungary:  
there's a large number of pseudo-civil entities and initiatives within the scope of activities of proposal-making, advisory 
and coordinative bodies. 
A special  appearance of the abovementioned difficulties is  the lack of strong and effective  state-civil  society joint  
mechanisms which aggregate and uphold Roma (Gypsy) interests. 
In summary we can draw the conclusion that both the individual segments of civil society, the political culture and also  
the administrative bodies participating in legislation i. e. their representatives must improve to comply with the already 
existing legal framework of statutory instruments. 
67See for  example  Trócsányi,  László.  1993.  Közjogi  változások és  a  rendszerváltás.  [Public  law changes  and  the 
transition] Magyar Közigazgatás (1993) 7: 5. 
68Kéri, László. 2001. A kormányzati döntéshozatal szervezetszociológiai nézőpontból. [Governmental decision-making 
from organisational sociology point of view] In Közpolitika. Szöveggyűjtemény. [Public Policy Reader] Edited by Pesti, 
Sándor. Budapest: Rejtjel. 218. 
